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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
recovery when there is a breach of a covenant to repair but no other indica-
tion of control of the premises by the landlord. There still would be no duty
to inspect and the landlord must exercise reasonable care only after being
told of the need to repair.7"
The Henderson court thus showed a progressive vein by indicating that
in some cases a tenant may recover consequential damages occasioned by
his landlord's breach of an implied warranty of habitability. With its
holding that the landlord must have notice of the defect and that the te-
nant's reasonable inspection not discover the defect, however, the court
has to some extent reinforced the landlord's immunity to liability for
defects on the leased premises. Modem rejection of caveat lessee and the
frequent modem reality of the landlord's greater ability to make repairs
have tended to shift many forms of liability from the tenant to the
landlord. It remains to be seen whether Missouri courts will go further in
this direction in the future by applying a general negligence standard to
the landlord, by finding a duty to inspect the premises before leasing, by
finding the landlord has a duty to do more than disclose a latent defect ex-
isting at the time of the lease, or by no longer requiring other signs of con-
trol for recovery from a breach of a covenant to repair.
EDWARD M. PULTZ
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS-WHO
CAN SPEAK FOR A CORPORATE CLIENT
Diversified Industries, Inc. v. Meredith'
In 1974 and 1975, during the course of a proxy fight, facts emerged in-
dicating that Diversified Industries, Inc., may have used a "slush fund" to
bribe purchasing agents of companies with whom Diversified dealt. When
the proxy fight was settled, the Board of Directors of Diversified determin-
ed, in the Spring of 1975, to have an investigation made of the business
practices that had been disclosed. The board authorized the employment
of a Washington, D.C. law firm to conduct the investigation and make a
report with recommendations as to a course of action. The officers, direc-
Strickland, 176 Neb. 633, 126 N.W.2d 888 (1964); Harvey v. Seale, 362 S.W.2d
310 (Tex. 1962).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 357, comment d (1965).
1. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
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tors, and employees of the corporation were directed to cooperate fully
with the investigation. In the course of the investigation the law firm inter-
viewed several Diversified employees, and in its final report, submitted in
December 1975, identified these employees and set out the substance of
what they had said. 2
In July 1976 the Weatherhead Company filed suit against Diversified
alleging conspiracy, tortious interference with contractual relationships
between itself and its employees, and violation of section 4 of the Clayton
Antitrust Act.3 Weatherhead sought discovery of several documents and
memoranda including the December report to Diversified from the law
firm.4 Diversified objected, contending that the documents fell within the
traditional attorney-client privilege and also were protected under the
"work product" rule. 6 The district court overruled the objections, denied
motions for reconsideration and certification, and ordered disclosure of
the materials.
Diversified petitioned the Eighth Circuit for a writ of mandamus7 to
compel Chief Judge Meredith of the district court to stay his order. A panel
of the court of appeals denied the petition, holding that the documents
were not protected either by the attorney-client privilege or by the work
product rule. The panel found the attorney-client privilege inapplicable
because the law firm was not hired by Diversified to provide legal services
2. The December report recommended the adoption of certain specified
accounting procedures, certain personnel changes, and Board consideration of
the possible restoration of allegedly misused assets. Id. at 615.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
4. Weatherhead also sought discovery of a June 19, 1975, memorandum
from the law firm to Diversified; copies of certain corporate minutes containing
references to the December report and the June memorandum; and a letter dated
January 30, 1976, from the president of Diversified that referred to the report and
memorandum. The court in the instant case held the memorandum was not pro-
tected from discovery because it did not contain confidential information. 572
F.2d at 607. The corporate minutes and the January 30 letter were found to be
protected because their disclosure would entail disclosure of material in the
December report which was here held to be a privileged communication from at-
torney to client. As to the corporate minutes, there was a strong dissent by Chief
Judge Gibson who argued that publication of parts of the December report in the
minutes constituted a waiver of the privilege; ChiefJudge Gibson was alone in this
view. Id. at 616.
5. The common law statement of the privilege may be found in 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 at 554 (McNaughten rev. 1961): "(1) Where legal
advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5)
by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by
himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived."
6. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
7. The court of appeals held that where a claim of attorney-client privilege
has been raised and rejected by a district court mandamus is available as a means
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or advice." Upon rehearing en banc solely on the issue of attorney-client
privilege, the court held the December report and other documents which
included parts of that report to be privileged.
Considering the issue on which the panel had decided the case, the
court en banc held that an attorney-client relationship did in fact exist bet-
ween Diversified and the law firm. Citing various authorities for the pro-
position "that a matter committed to a professional legal adviser is prima
facie so committed for the sake of legal advice... unless it clearly appears
to be lacking in aspects requiring legal advice," 9 the court found that the
matter in the instant case was, prima facie, committed to a professional
legal adviser for the sake of legal advice and that there was no showing to
the contrary. ' 0 Since an attorney-client relationship was found to exist, the
question became, were the Diversified employees interviewed by the law
firm speaking for the corporate client within the bounds of the privilege? It
is in the response to this question that the court's opiniori makes a signifi-
cant contribution.
Heretofore the federal courts, in a controversy not reflected in
Missouri courts, I I have been divided between two major tests for handling
8. 572 F.2d at 603. In the panel's view, the law firm was hired "solely" to
investigate the facts and make business recommendations. Since the firm was not
acting in a legal capacity there was no attorney-client relationship and hence no
privilege. The court found the work product rule inapplicable because the law
firm's work was not done in preparation for any trial nor in anticipation of litiga-
tion as required by FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). Id. at 604.
9. 572 F.2d at 610. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2296; 8 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 133 (1970). Judge
Henley differs on the interpretation of the language from WIGMORE, 572 F.2d at
614 (Henley, J., concurring and dissenting).
10. Judge Henley, writing for the panel and later in dissent to the en banc
opinion, preferred a strict construction of the attorney-client privilege so as to
limit "the adverse effect of its application on the disclosure of truth." 572 F.2d at
602, 612. He held that the law firm was employed not to provide legal services or
advice but "to make a factual investigation and business recommendations," and
therefore no attorney-client relationship was established. Id. at 614.
One might query Judge Henley's argument that employment of a law firm "to
make a factual investigation and business recommendations" (assuming ar-
guendo the aptness of this characterization) necessarily precludes the rendering
of legal services. If the quintessence of legal practice is the application of general
legal principles to specific problems, then the form of the output of that applica-
tion is not determinative of whether or not a legal service was performed. The
mere fact that the resulting recommendations were of a business character does
not mean a legal analysis was not performed.
11. Missouri courts have not come squarely to grips with the "who speaks for
the corporate client" problem in the context of the attorney-client privilege. The
reason for this seems to be that from 1953 until 1975 the Missouri Supreme Court
treated the work product rule as a privilege. State ex rel. Terminal R.R. Ass'n v.
Flynn, 363 Mo. 1065, 257 S.W.2d 69 (En Banc 1953). If work product is treated
as a privilege, material so covered is absolutely protected and is not discoverable
upon a showing of substantial need coupled with inability to obtain equivalent
materials by other means, as it would be under the federal work product rule.
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this question, the "control group" test 2 and the "Harper &Row" test.13 In'
Diversified the Eighth Circuit announced a substantially modified version
of the "Harper & Row test:
[T]he attorney-client privilege is applicable to an employee's com-
munication if (1) the communication was made for the purpose of
securing legal advice; (2) the employee making the communica-
tion did so at the direction of his corporate superior; (3) the
superior made the request so that the corporation could secure
legal advice; (4) the subject matter of the communication is within
the scope of the employee's corporate duties; and (5) the com-
munication is not disseminated beyond those persons who,
because of the corporate structure, need to know its contents. We
note, moreover, that the corporation has the burden of showing
that the communication in issue meets all of the above re-
quirements. 14
This test actually represents the fourth in a series of answers to the question
who can speak for the corporate client under the attorney-client privilege. ' 5
The first approach was the suggestion by Judge Wyzanski in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. 16 that a confidential communica-
tion between an attorney and any "officer or employee" of a corporation
involving the solicitation or giving of legal advice was privileged.' 7
Thus, under Flynn, the communications of all employees, if elicited in anticipa-
tion of litigation, were absolutely privileged even if no attorney-client relation-
ship had been established and even if the employee was not purporting to be
speaking for the corporation to an attorney. Proceeding on this basis it was simply
not necessary for Missouri courts to ask if a given employee spoke for the corpora-
tion for purposes of asserting the attorney-client privilege.
Federal courts have criticized the Flynn holding and have refused to follow it
in diversity proceedings even though FED. R. EVID. 501 requires federal courts in
diversity cases to follow state law of privilege. Parrett v. Ford Motor Co., 47
F.R.D. 22 (W.D. Mo. 1968); Whitakerv. Davis, 45 F.R.D. 270 (W.D. Mo. 1968).
See also 4 J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.64(5) at 455 (2d. ed.
1976).- The Flynn rule was followed in Missouri until 1975. Lindberg v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 571 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1975). Missouri Supreme Court
rules effective January 1, 1975 adopted the federal work product rule. MO. R.
CIV. P. 56.01(b)(3). Missouri courts have yet to face directly the problem of who
can speak for the corporate client within the attorney-client privilege.
12. The "control group" test was initially formulated in City of Philadelphia
v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
13. The "Harper & Row" test was initially formulated in Harper & Row
Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by vote of 4 to 4
without opinion, 400 U.S. 348 (1971).
14. 572 F.2d at 609.
15. For a seminal analysis of the attorney-corporate client problem see
Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953 (1956).
16. 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950).
17. The central focus of United Shoe, however, was whether or not attorneys
in the corporation's patent department were acting as legal advisers or merely as
businessmen. If they were not acting in a legal capacity, as the court held, there
1979]
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Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America' also suggests that any
employee can speak for the corporation. This is the broadest of the four
approaches in that it protects the largest number of communications.
The advantages of the broad approach are that it is easy to follow, it is
predictable, and it provides maximum encouragement for the disclosure
of full and truthful information to attorneys.1 9 Full disclosure by a client to
his attorney is, of course, the policy goal which the attorney-client privilege
in its modern form seeks to achieve. 20 On the other hand, the broad ap-
proach to the privilege, especially in the corporate context, runs counter to
the modern trends of expansive discovery. 21 It also runs counter to United
States Supreme Court dictum in Hickman v. Taylor that mere witnesses
are not covered by the attorney-client privilege even if they happen to be
employees of the client. 22
The implications of Hickman, while apparently not considered in
United Shoe and Zenith, where explicitly taken into account in City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 23 when the second, and nar-
rowest, of the four tests was formulated. Referring to United Shoe, Judge
Kirkpatrick said, "Judge Wyzanski... suggested that the privilege extends
to an extremely broad class of employees, but I cannot help feeling that he
is in conflict with Hickman v. Taylor, which very clearly shows the distinc-
tion between statements by employees of the client and statements by the
client himself." 24 Judge Kirkpatrick then stated the "control group" test
which, according to the Diversified court,25 remains the dominant ap-
proach:
was no attorney-client relationship and communications to and from them were
not privileged. Judge Wyzanski was probably not attempting a precise answer to
the "who can speak for the corporate client" problem. Still, the case is cited for
the proposition that any employee can speak for the corporation. See City of
Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
18. 121 F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954).
19. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b) [04]
(1975).
20. Originally the privilege belonged to the attorney, not to the client, as a
point of honor; it permitted the attorney to preserve his honor by keeping the
secrets confided in him. Id. 503[02].
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b); C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 96 at 202
(2d ed. 1972).
22. "[T]he protective cloak of this privilege does not extend to information
which an attorney secures from a witness .. " 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). In
Hickman the witnesses were in fact employees of the attorney's client.
23. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
24. Id. at 485. Another reason for Judge Kirkpatrick's abundance of cau-
tion may have been indicated in his reference to Radiant Burners, Inc. v.
American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) which had held that a cor-
poration could not plead the attorney-client privilege. This case was on appeal at
the time the Westinghouse case was being decided. The holding in Radiant
Burners was subsequently reversed. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963).
25. 572 F.2d at 608.
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[I]f the employee making the communication... is in a position to
control or even to take a substantial part in a decision about any
action which the corporation may take upon the advice of the at-
torney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group which
has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies) the cor-
poration when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer and the
privilege would apply. 26
Several arguments have been advanced on behalf of the control group
test. Perhaps the most fundamental argument is based on Wigmore's
observation that the attorney-client privilege should be narrowly con-
strued because its "benefits are all indirect and speculative; its obstruction
is plain and concrete." 27 The narrow parameters of the control group test
minimize the obstructive suppression of relevant evidence.
Another argument is that the control group test is a "bright line" test
that is easy to follow and assures predictable results. 28 Predictability is im-
portant because the full disclosure purpose of the privilege will not be at-
tained unless communicants can tell in advance with some certainty that a
communication will be protected.
Finally, it is suggested that when lower level employees are interviewed
by attorneys their most significant considerations are with respect to
whether management will approve or disapprove of what they say, not
whether what they say will be disclosed to opposing litigants. Extending
the attorney-client privilege beyond the control group to these employees
does nothing to meet their real concerns and, hence, does nothing to pro-
mote full disclosure. 29
26. 210 F. Supp. at 485. Illustrative applications of the control group test
are Hogan v. Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308 (N.D. Okla. 1967), affJd sub nom., Natta v.
Hogan, 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968) (the Manager and Assistant Manager of the
Research and Development Department of Phillips Petroleum Co. and the
members of the company's Patent Committee were held to be control group
members, a research chemist and a group leader in the Research and Develop-
ment Department were held not to be control group members); Garrison v.
General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (Division Manager and
his Chief Engineer held to be control group members, two employees reporting to
Chief Engineer but also authorized to communicate confidential information
directly to General Motor's patent attorneys held not to be control group
members). But see Congoleum Indus., Inc. v. G.A.F. Corp., 49 F.R.D. 82 (E.D.
Pa. 1969), affd, 478 F.2d 1398 (3rd Cir. 1973) (an investigatory group including
the Director of Research of the corporation and the Director of Research of a divi-
sion of the corporation was held to be in an advisory, not a decision-making role
and hence not part of the control group).
27. 8J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 2291. See also Note, Attorney-Client
Priilege for Coporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 HARV. L. REv. 424
(1970).
28. Note, supra note 27, at 426.
29. Id. at 429. For further support and refinement of the control group test
see Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & D.D. Co., 68 F.R.D. 397
(E.D. Va. 1975) (court follows Congoleum holding that a person who merely fur-
nishes technical information is not in the control group).
1979] 355
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The main criticism of the control group test is that it does not comport
with the realities of corporate life and, therefore, does not promote the
purposes of the attorney-client privilege. It is argued that in the modern
corporation middle-management executives, who may not qualify for in-
clusion in the control group, often have responsibility for making recom-
mendations that are ratified perfunctorily by higher management.3 0 Good
social policy would "encourage a desire for legal advice at whatever level
that desire exists within the corporation. 3 1 The central issue should not be
an employee's rank, status, or function in a corporation, but rather
whether he "honestly sought legal advice or services that could have
benefitted the corporation. 3 2 This argument brings to the fore the subjec-
tive element of the employee's motivation as opposed to the objective
ascertainment of the employee's position or function in the corporation.
Another criticism, which anticipated a case such as Diversified, is that
the narrow bounds of the control group test may discourage a vigorous
program of antitrust compliance using outside counsel to conduct internal
investigations.3 3 To be effective, such an investigation may well require
counsel to obtain information from lower and middle level employees, and
the control group test could hinder full disclosure.
Finally, it is suggested that the predictability of the control group test
may be somewhat illusory. It is not always easy to tell who the members of
the control group are; titles may be manipulated to protect the maximum
number of communications, and courts may have difficulty discerning the
real decision-making patterns behind the titles. There may be difficulty in
applying the test even without any deceptive manipulation of titles. In
Honeywell, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,s4 the court was confronted with
documents in counsel's hands where no author was given or where the
author was indicated only as "Honeywell employee," "Honeywell manage-
ment," "Honeywell inventor," or "Honeywell Chief Pilot." The court said
it was not possible to tell whether such persons were members of the control
group, and it placed on plaintiffs the burden of showing that they were
control group members.3 5 Such an approach may be fair, but the putative
"bright line" of the control group test has become a little less bright.
In 1970 the Seventh Circuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v.
30. Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRAC. LAW. 15,
19 (Nov. 1969). See also Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate
Counsel, 28 ALA. LAW. 352, 375 (1967).
31. Kobak, The Uneven Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to
Corporations in Federal Courts, 6 GA. L. REV. 339, 368 (1972).
32. Id. at 369.
33. Pye, supra note 30, at 19.
34. 50 F.R.D. 117 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
35. See also Camco, Inc. v. Baker Oil Tools, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 384 (S.D. Tex.
1968) (bald assertion of attorney-client privilege without specifics as to who
prepared documents in question was not sufficient to invoke the privilege).
356 [Vol. 44
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Decker 6 took the third step in the sequence by striking a middle ground
between the any employee test of United Shoe and the narrow restrictions
of the control group test. Characterizing the control group test as "not
wholly adequate," the court said:
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though not a
member of its control group, is-sufficiently identified with the cor-
poration so that his communication to the corporation's attorney is
privileged where the employee makes the communication at the
direction of his superiors in the corporation and where the subject
matter upon which the attorney's advice is sought by the corpora-
tion and dealt with in the communication is the performance by
the employee of the duties of his employment. 3 7
Applying this test, the court found to be privileged certain employee's
statements which the district court had found not privileged under the
control group test. The Harper & Row test protects, potentially at least,
the communications to an attorney of any employee as long as such com-
munications are at the direction of his superiors and deal with the duties of
his employment. Thus, the principal advantage of the Harper & Row test
is that, in line with the purposes of the attorney-client privilege, it gives
broad encouragement to employees to make full disclosures in their com-
munications with the corporation's attorneys. A vigorous inhouse antitrust
compliance program, which might be inhibited under the control group
test, could freely move forward under the Harper & Row approach . 3
The principal criticism of the Harper & Row test has been its suscep-
tibility to abuse. "[U]nder the Harper test, nothing prevents corporations
36. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), affd by vote of 4 to 4 without opinion, 400
U.S. 348 (1971).
37. 423 F.2d at 491-92. While not explicitly adopting the Harper & Row
test, the court in Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 35, 40 (E.D.N.Y. 1973)
stated and applied a broader approach than the control group test:
[T]his court chooses to ask generally, whether, under all the relevant cir-
cumstances, including but not limited to, the nature and content of the
communications, the extent of their disclosure within the corporation,
and the relationship of the employees involved to the communication
and to the corporation, the employees concerned may be thought to have
acted as representatives of the client for purposes of recognizing the
privilege.
Under this formulation the court found to be privileged documents com-
municated between defendant corporation's patent attorney and a group of four
employees comprising the Project Engineer and co-inventor of the patents in suit,
the Chief Engineering Consultant and co-inventor, the Vice President of the cor-
poration and his assistant, both of whom served as liaison with the patent at-
torney. See also Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal.
1978) (court held plaintiffs statements to her employer's attorney were not
privileged under either the control group or Harper & Row test).
38. For an analysis generally favorable to the Harper & Row approach see
Kobak, supra note 31, at 339.
1979]
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from directing all their employees to channel all their reports to corporate
attorneys, thereby rendering all such information privileged."3 9
Another criticism has centered on the court's explicit refusal in Harper
& Row to express an opinion with respect to employees who are no more
than bystander witnesses, i. e., "employees who, almost fortuitously,
observe events which may generate liability on the part of the
corporation. 40 Critics point out that for the purposes of the privilege the
manner in which information is acquired is irrelevant. What matters is
whether the information is disclosed to counsel, not how it was acquired. 4'
The new test announced in Diversified by the Eighth Circuit is the
fourth and most recent attempt to resolve the spokesman-for-the-
corporate-client problem. Essentially, the new test is Harper & Row with
modifications designed to cure the main defect of that test. To the "at the
direction of his superior" and "concerning the duties of his employment"
requirements of Harper & Row, the Diversified test adds requirements
that the employee's communication be for the purpose of securing legal
advice, that the superior's request be made so that the corporation can
secure legal advice, and that the confidentiality of the communication be
maintained within a "need to know" perimeter. The Diversified test also is
explicit in putting the burden on the corporation to show that all the re-
quirements are met.
These requirements, particularly the stress on the relevance of the
communications to the securing of legal advice and the superior's motives
in requesting such advice, are consonant with the purposes of the attorney-
client privilege, and should be effective safeguards against those who
might be tempted to funnel corporate business records through their at-
torneys to prevent subsequent disclosure. The only communications pro-
tected are those made for the purpose of securing legal advice for the cor-
poration; however, communications for such purpose may be protected
under this test even though not made by a member of the corporate control
group. Thus, the Diversfied test is narrower than Harper & Row, but
broader than the pure control group test.
By retaining the "duties of his employment" prong of Harper & Row,
the Diversified test removes "from the scope of the privilege any com-
munication in which the employee functions merely as a fortuitous
witness. 42 Although inconsistent with the strict logic of the privilege, 43 the
restriction avoids conflict with Hickman and is consistent with the current
trend toward broad discovery procedures.
39. Note, Privileged Communications-Inroads on the "Control Group"
Test in the Corporate Area, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 759, 766 (1971). See also 2J.
WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 19, 503(b)[04].
40. 423 F.2d at 491. This reticence on the court's part is no doubt due to the
continuing implications of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See note 22
supra.
41. Note, supra note 27, at 434.
42. 572 F.2d at 609.
43. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
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